
















Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
for the Degree of Master of Science (Option Finance) at 
Concordia University 










School of Graduate Studies 
This is to certify that the thesis prepared 
By: Yijing Ren 
Entitled: Ownership structure and IPO underpricing 
and submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Science (Option Finance) 
complies with the regulations of the University and meets the accepted standards with respect to 
originality and quality. 









Imants Paeglis  
 Co-Supervisor 
Parianen Veeren  
 
Approved by  
 Rahul Ravi, Chair of Department or Graduate Program Director 
 
 2020  




We examine the influence of ownership structure on underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) in 
the US. While the existing literature has largely focused on either founders or venture capitalists, we show 
that the ownership structure of US IPOs is more complex and cannot be adequately characterized by these 
two types of blockholders. We find that the influence of blockholders on underpricing is not 
unidimensional – the positive influence of individual blockholders (venture capital backing) on 
underpricing is present only in the venture-backed firms (those with individual blockholders). Further, we 
also find that such firms experience insignificant offer price revision, suggesting that their higher 
underpricing is not driven by negative information revealed during the roadshow. Finally, we show that 
the difference in underpricing between VC-backed firms with individual blockholders and those without 
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We examine the influence of ownership structure on underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) 
in the US. The existing literature, for the most part, has focused either on founders (as individual 
blockholders) or on venture capitalists (as corporate blockholders). We show that the ownership structure 
of US IPOs is more complex and cannot be adequately characterized by the above two types of 
blockholders. Further, we show that the influence of such blockholders is not unidimensional – the 
influence of individual blockholders varies by the presence (if any) of corporate blockholders while that 
of the corporate blockholders – by the presence of individual blockholders.  
In this paper, we characterize the ownership structure using both the type (individual versus 
corporate) and the identity of the largest blockholder. Individual blockholders are classified into family, 
non-family insiders, and outsiders, while corporate blockholders – into venture capitalists (VCs) and 
non-VCs ones. From now onwards, we will refer to firms with family as the largest individual 
blockholder as family firms. Similarly, we will refer to firms with non-family insiders (outsiders) as the 
largest individual blockholder as non-family insider (outsider) firms. Finally, we will refer to firms with 
venture capitalists (non-VC) as the largest corporate blockholder as venture-backed (non-venture-backed) 
firms. It is important to note that in our paper the term non-venture-backed firms have a different meaning 
than in the existing literature, which has used the term to denote both the firms without corporate 
blockholders and those with non-VC corporate blockholders. We use it to refer only to the latter ones. 
We hypothesize that firms with individual blockholders will be associated with higher 
underpricing for one (or both) of the following reasons. First, presence of individual blockholders can 
increase the level of asymmetric information about the firm either because (a) such blockholders, 
especially the founders, may not have enough knowledge and experience to lead (manage) a public firm 
or (b) they may also have power in excess of that implied by their ownership stakes allowing them to 
become entrenched more easily (as compared to blockholders in more mature firms). Second, individual 
blockholders may attract media interest and thus attain a celebrity status, which, in turn, creates an 
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additional demand from IPO (mostly retail) investors. This is most likely to happen with founders in 
venture-backed firms. 
While both of the above reasons are likely to result in higher IPO underpricing, they have 
different implications for offer price revision between the middle of the initial filing range and the final 
offer price. This allows us to distinguish between the two potential causes of higher underpricing of firms 
with individual blockholders. In the case of individual blockholders increasing the level of asymmetric 
information, we expect there to be either a reduction (no change) in the offer price as a result of a 
roadshow if the underwriters have not (have) priced in the potential negative effects of the individual 
blockholders presence. If, on the other hand, firms with individual blockholders attract media interest 
becomes celebrities, we expect there to be an upward revision (no change) in the offer price as a result of 
a roadshow if the underwriters have not (have) priced in the potential positive effects of the individual 
blockholders presence. Finally, if the main reason for the higher underpricing of firms with individual 
blockholders is the additional media attention and celebrity status of such blockholders, we expect to see 
no significant differences between such firms and the firms with no individual blockholders, after 
controlling for the celebrity status of the individual blockholders. 
 Our findings can be summarized as follows. First, we find that firms with individual blockholders 
have higher IPO underpricing, especially those in which the largest corporate blockholder is a VC. 
Further, of the three types of individual blockholders, the effect in most pronounced for founders and 
outsiders. Second, we find that firms with individual blockholders do not experience a significant 
downward revision in the offer price. In fact, such firms exhibit higher offer price revision relative to the 
firms with no individual blockholders, which experience significant reductions in the offer price during 
the roadshow. This suggests that the higher IPO underpricing of firms with individual blockholders is 
most likely driven by the media attention and the celebrity status of such blockholders.  
 We further tests this conjecture using the dollar wealth of the largest individual blockholder as a 
measure of her celebrity status. Anecdotal evidence suggests that more successful IPO insiders (as 
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measured by the value of their ownership stakes) are more likely to attract media attention We find that 
the dollar wealth of the largest individual blockholder is positively related to the offer price revision and 
underpricing for venture-backed firms. More importantly, after controlling for the celebrity status of the 
largest individual blockholder, we find that firms with individual blockholders no longer exhibit higher 
IPO underpricing.  
Our paper is related and contributes to several streams of literature. First, we contribute to and 
extend the literature on the influence of ownership structure on IPO underpricing. We show that the 
unidimensional classification into either family or VC-backed firms does not adequately describe the 
complexity of the ownership structure of US IPOs and its influence on underpricing. Consider the 
literature on the influence of VCs on underpricing, which has reported conflicting results. While the early 
studies showed that venture-backed IPOs are less underpriced, the more recent ones have found the 
opposite result. Our findings suggest that the higher underpricing of VC-backed firms may not be driven 
by the venture capitalists themselves but rather by the celebrity status of individual blockholders of such 
firms.  
Second, we contribute to the literature on IPO underpricing. In particular, we identify a new 
factor that has a significant influence on underpricing, namely, the celebrity status of the largest 
individual blockholder. While there is a literature on the media coverage of the firms going public, we are 
not aware of any study to link the celebrity status of the individual blockholders and IPO underpricing. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We review the relevant literature in Section 2. 
Section 3 develops testable hypotheses, while Section 4 describes our data and sample selection criteria. 
In Section 5 we describe our empirical tests and report their results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
Our paper is related and contributes to the following three streams of literature. First, we 
contribute to the literature on IPO underpricing. Second, we contribute to the literature on the influence of 
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blockholders on IPO underpricing. Third, our study builds on the literature that has examined the 
advantages and disadvantages of the celebrity status of firm insiders. We now review these three streams 
of literature in detail. 
 
2.1. Determinants of IPO underpricing 
Theoretical literature on underpricing has viewed asymmetric information as the main 
determinant of IPO underpricing. Three main theories of IPO underpricing are signalling model of Welch 
(1989), bookbuilding model of Benveniste and Spindt (1989), and information production model of 
Chemmanur (1993). 
Welch (1989) provided a two-period signalling model, stating that firm owner knows more about 
firm’s value than do outside investors. Because of this information asymmetry, owners of high-quality 
firms use underpricing to signal their quality to the outsiders. These costs of signalling are later 
recuperated when such firms obtain a higher price at their SEOs. Low-quality firms have to incur 
imitation costs to pretend to be high quality ones, but, since their true quality will be discovered by the 
market between IPO and SEO, such firms will not recover their losses due to underpricing. Underpricing 
by high-quality firms makes imitation by the low-quality too costly and therefore forces low-quality firms 
to reveal their true value at IPO. 
Benveniste and Spindt (1989) build on the evidence that underwriters change the expected offer 
price in prospectus to the final offer price based on the information gathered during the pre-issue period. 
The final offer price is higher (lower) than the expected offer price when investors reveal positive 
(negative) information. When the demand is high, they adjust offer price upward and vice versa. 
Underpricing is used by underwriter to compensate investors for truthfully revealing information. In this 
case, firms with an upward adjusted offer price are likely to have higher underpricing. Hanley (1993) 
empirically test this prediction of Benveniste and Spindt (1989), confirming that issues that have upward 
revision of offer price are more underpriced. 
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Chemmanur (1993) proposed a theoretical model in which insiders know more than do outsiders. 
In his model underpricing emerges as the solution to the asymmetric information between insiders and 
outsiders. In other words, insiders use underpricing to promote information production by outsiders. 
Higher information production reduces the level of asymmetric information, increasing the firm’s 
secondary market share price. This, in turn, benefits the insiders when they either want to sell their own 
shares in the secondary market or when the firm need to raise money through an SEO.  
 
2.2.  The influence of blockholders on IPO underpricing 
At the time of the IPO, there are two types of blockholders present in the firm – individual and 
corporate ones. In this section, we will first review literature on the influence of individual blockholders 
on underpricing and then proceed with a review of literature on the influence of corporate blockholders. 
 
2.2.1. The influence of individual blockholders on IPO underpricing 
The literature has focused almost exclusively on the founders and founding families, with some 
attention to professional CEOs (non-family insiders), and almost complete ignorance of outside individual 
blockholders. This is not surprising, given that at the time of IPO, the founder or her descendants is most 
likely the largest individual blockholder in the company and has a significant influence on the 
management and governance of the firm. He (2008) finds that founder-managed firms are associated with 
better financial performance as compared to those managed by professional CEOs. Also, founder-CEOs’ 
interests are better aligned with those of the minority shareholders, relative to their professional 
counterparts. Paeglis and Tirtiroglu (2006) compared family and non-family firms, and found that former 
are more underpriced, especially those in which the founder is both the CEO and the chairman of the 
board. Chandler et al. (2019) find that family firms are more underpriced and argue this is driven by the 
fact that the more conservative, less aggressive, and more long-term orientation of family firms makes 
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them less attractive to investors, resulting in higher underpricing. Finally, Bruton et al. (2009) find that 
underpricing of UK IPOs is a convex function of founder ownership. 
According to psychological ownership theory, founder-CEOs are more likely to feel a greater 
sense of possessiveness and psychological attachment to the firm they have created than are non-founder 
CEOs (Piercer et al., 2001). Therefore founder-CEOs have the incentive to implement control-enhancing 
mechanisms (CEMs) to protect them from losing control over the firm. Fattoum and Delmar (2012) and 
Fattoum, Delmar, and Wright (2018) found that founder CEOs are more likely to implement these 
mechanisms (as compared to non–founder CEOs). They also document a positive relationship between 
number of CEMs and IPO underpricing. In addition, the influence of CEMs on underpricing is stronger in 
founder-CEO led firms as compared to the non-founder CEOs managed ones.  
 
2.2.2. The influence of corporate blockholders on IPO underpricing 
There are two types of corporate blockholders presents in a firm before its IPO. First, venture 
capitalists, for which the IPO represents the beginning of the exit from their portfolio company. Second, 
non-venture-capitalist corporate blockholders who may have incentives to maintain their ownership 
stakes in the newly public firm and therefore are likely to have a different influence on underpricing. 
Unfortunately, we are not aware of any study that has explicitly looked at the influence of non-VC 
corporate blockholders on IPO underpricing. Most of the studies has distinguished between 
venture-backed and non-venture backed firms, with the latter including both the firms without corporate 
blockholders and those with non-VC ones. Consequently, the literature review on this topic will focus 
exclusively on the VC-backed ones. 
Venture capitalists support portfolio companies in their early stages and exit after the end of the 
lockup period. Many previous studies have examined the influence of venture capital backing on the IPO 
underpricing. Part of the literature argues that VC-backed firms are associated with lower underpricing. 
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Three different hypotheses have been used to explain the role of venture capital backing in the IPO 
process: certification hypothesis, screening and monitoring hypothesis, and market power hypothesis.  
Megginson and Weiss (1991) argue that venture capitalists can mitigate information asymmetry, 
certify the true inside information, and therefore reduce IPO underpricing. They also show that the 
presence of venture capitalists certifies the offer to underwriters, which lowers the underwriter 
compensation, and reduces the costs of offering. Dolvin and Pyles (2006) also find that higher quality 
venture capitalists will perform a more valuable certification role.  
Barry et al. (1990) and Jain and Kini (1995) provide support for screening and monitoring 
hypothesis. The monitoring role of VCs leads to lower underpricing of the firm. They further pointed out 
that better monitoring skills of venture capitalists reduce investor uncertainty and therefore decrease IPO  
underpricing. Kaplan and Stromberg (2001) also show that venture capitalists’ ability to conduct 
pre-investment screening and post-investment monitoring enable them to select the best portfolio 
companies and subsequently improve their performance.  
Chemmanur and Loutskina (2006) strongly reject the certification hypothesis. They argue that 
venture capitalists aim at obtaining the highest price possible (rather than the one closest to the intrinsic 
value). More importantly, their findings show strong evidence for the market power hypothesis, showing 
that venture capitals are able to attract greater participation to an IPO (such as underwriters, institutional 
investors, and analysts), thus obtaining a higher valuation for the IPOs backed by them.  
However, a number of studies have called the above hypotheses into question. Gompers (1996) 
provide evidence in support of the grandstanding hypothesis arguing that young VCs have incentives to 
bring IPOs to market pre-maturely. This leads to companies backed by young VCs being more 
underpriced. Since taking firms public is critical for young venture capitalists in terms of future 
fundraising and establishing reputation, they are willing to bear the cost of underpricing. Gompers and 
Lerner (1997) also question the certification hypothesis and show that the magnitude of the difference in 
underpricing between venture-backed and non-venture-backed firms is sensitive to the choice of 
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estimation method period and methodology. Lee and Wahal (2004) also support grandstanding hypothesis, 
and find that, after addressing the endogeneity issue over the entire sample period from 1980 to 2000, 
VC-backed IPOs exhibit significantly greater underpricing than do non-VC backed ones. Bradley and 
Jordan (2002) also found that VC-backed firms are more underpriced during 1990-1999, but the 
differences vanish after controlling for industry, listing exchange, and underwriter reputation. Bruton et al. 
(2010) doubt the monitoring hypothesis. They argue that retained ownership by venture capitalists may 
not mitigate the potential of agency problems since they do not focus on monitoring the firm after IPO, 
which leads to a negative impact of their retained ownership on performance. 
 
2.3. The advantages and disadvantages of celebrity insiders 
Hayward, Rindova, and Pollock (2004) suggest that the “CEO celebrity” are created by 
journalists, because the latter tend to over-attribute a firm’s action and performance to its CEO, rather 
than to broader organizational or environmental factors. CEOs who believe in the over-attribution in the 
press are likely to become overconfident about their ability and judgement, and may stick to the strategy 
that brought them fame. Such CEOs may rely too much on strategy that made them famous and may 
therefore become reluctant to change. 
Lovelace, Bundy, Hambrick, and Pollock (2018) also find that celebrity CEOs tend to persist in 
their behavior, which creates major vulnerabilities for their organizations when external or internal 
circumstances change. As a result, CEO celebrity can bring negative organization outcomes, and thus 
harm investors, employees and other stakeholders. Finally, Quigley and Hambrick (2015) propose an 
explanation of the dramatic increase in attributions of CEO significance. They use multiple performance 
measures and find that the increasing attribution of executive significance is due to the significant 
increase in the influence of individual chief executives on company outcomes. Accordingly, CEOs have 





3. Hypothesis development 
We examine the influence of blockholder presence on IPO underpricing. Venture capitalists at the 
time of the IPO may be considered short-term shareholders. Venture capital funds are structured as 
limited partnership to raise fund and make investments (Lee and Wahal, 2004). After a set number of 
years (usually ten), VC firms have to liquidate their investment and return money to their investors. The 
VCs therefore have a strong motivation to exit the investments after IPO in order to distribute assets to 
the limited partner investors and to establish a track record needed to raise further funds (Gompers 1996; 
Brav and Gompers, 2003). 
The individual blockholders, on the other hand, are likely to remain with the firm well beyond the 
IPO and the venture capitalist exit. This especially applies to the founders who are most likely to be 
long-term blockholders. Presence of such blockholders can have two potential influences on the IPO 
underpricing. First, they can increase the level of asymmetric information about the firm. Insiders, 
especially the founders, may not have enough knowledge and skills to manage the firm. Also, insiders in 
the newly public firms may also have power in excess of that implied by their ownership stakes allowing 
them to become entrenched more easily as compared to their more mature counterparts.
1
 Finally, a firm 
at that stage of life cycle does not yet have a reputation on its own and has to rely on that of its founder. 
As indicated earlier, the theoretical literature has considered the level of asymmetric information to be the 
most important determinant of the IPO underpricing. To the extent that the above three factors are likely 
to lead to a higher level of asymmetric information, we expect to see a higher level of IPO underpricing 
for firms with individual blockholders.  
Second, individual blockholders can also attract interest and hype from IPO investors due to their 
celebrity status. The celebrity status of CEOs, founders, and other firm insiders has grown over the last 
                                                          
1
 Post-IPO exit by venture capitalists also leaves founders less monitored, especially those with intermediate levels 





 Zachary (1997) argues that media presence has become an increasingly important part of a 
CEOs job. The celebrity status of a CEO can be used to attract prospective new employees (Zachary, 
1997) and to “increase stock price, enhance a firm’s image, and improve the morale of employees and 
other stakeholders” (Edwards, 2014). Further, creation of a “personal brand” is becoming an increasingly 
important part of being a successful entrepreneur (Pofeldt, 2019; and Ray, 2019). Ray (2019) argues that 
to be successful, entrepreneurs have to be ready to use social media to build up their “personal brand”.  
 In recent years, founders, insiders, and early investors of startups also have joined the celebrity 
ranks. The names of the following insiders of some of our sample firms speak for themselves: Jack 
Dorsey of Twitter, Inc, Mark Zuckerberg of Facebook, Inc, and Elon Musk of Tesla, Inc.
3
 While 
sometimes controversial, they have attained a nation- (if not world-) wide name recognition. Retail IPO 
investors seem to be attracted by the “extreme bias toward optimism” (Cooper, Woo, and Dunkelberg, 
1988:106) exhibited by founders. Such investors have few, if any, dealings with entrepreneurs and 
therefore are unlikely to “discount” the overly optimistic view presented by the founders and enforced by 
the pro-entrepreneurship bias common in the popular business press. Further, the success and celebrity 
status has been largely linked to the insiders of the firms backed by the venture capitalists. 
Media attention and celebrity status of individual blockholders can influence the IPO 
underpricing in two ways. First, an over-optimism by the institutional investors, who participate in the 
roadshow and are most likely receiving the allocations at the offer price, would be reflected through the 
offer price revision during the roadshow and the resulting partial adjustment phenomenon (Hanley, 1993). 
Second, an over-optimism by the retail investors, who are more likely to buy shares on the first day of 
trading, is more likely to be reflected through an increased demand on the first day of trading (and thus be 
independent of /in addition to that created by the partial adjustment phenomenon).
4
  
                                                          
2
 For an in-depth analysis of causes and consequences of celebrity CEOs, see Hayward, Rindova, and Pollock 
(2004). 
3
 See https://www.cnet.com/news/tesla-motors-founders-now-there-are-five/ for why E. Musk, strictly speaking, is 
not Tesla founder. 
4
 Institutional investors are less likely to be subject to the hype biases / overoptimism (see, e.g., Verma and Verma, 
2008, who find that institutional investors are more rational than their individual counterparts). 
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To summarize, we expect firms with individual blockholders to have a higher level of IPO 
underpricing (relative to their counterparts without individual blockholders) – either because of the higher 
level of asymmetric information or because of the higher level of over-optimism by the potential IPO 
investors. Formally, our Hypothesis 1 is as follows: 
H1: Firms with individual blockholders will be associated with higher IPO underpricing. 
The above two potential explanations for the higher underpricing of firms with individual 
blockholders have different implications for the information generated during the roadshow, as reflected 
in the offer price revision between the middle of the initial filing range and the final offer price. In the 
case of individual blockholders increasing the level of asymmetric information, we expect there to be 
either a reduction (no change) in the offer price as a result of a roadshow if the underwriters have not 
(have) priced in the potential negative effects of an individual blockholder’s presence. If, on the other 
hand, firms with individual blockholders attract interest and hype from IPO investors (and are therefore 
subject to a higher level of overoptimism), we expect there to be an upward revision (no change) in the 
offer price as a result of a roadshow if the underwriters have not (have) priced in the potential positive 
effects of the individual blockholders presence. Formally, these two competing hypotheses can be 
summarized as follows: 
H2A: If the higher underpricing of firms with individual blockholders is driven by the higher level 
of asymmetric information about such firms, there will be a reduction (no change) in the offer 
price during the roadshow. 
H2B: If the higher underpricing of firms with individual blockholders is driven by overoptimism 
about such firms, there will be an increase (no change) in the offer price during the roadshow. 
The difference between a VC-backed firm and a one with no corporate blockholders is that, for 
the latter, IPO is the first time investors observe the valuation of the firm’s shares. For the former, there 
are implied valuations from the VC financing rounds, which give some indications of the fair value of the 
firm’s shares. Frequently, such valuations are used by the press to judge whether certain insiders of the 
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prospective IPO will obtain the billionaire status. In other words, the presence of pre-IPO valuations 
provides financial press an earlier and more reliable access to the estimates of the value of the insiders’ 
shares, making it easier for the financial press to make insiders into celebrities. To the extent that 
individual blockholders in VC-backed firms are more likely to have a higher name recognition and are 
more likely to have a celebrity status, we hypothesize that such blockholders will attract more interest 
from the potential IPO investors. This will result in a higher level of overoptimism about the firm and 
therefore a higher offer price revision during the roadshow. Formally, our third hypothesis is as follows: 
H3: VC-backed firms with individual blockholders are more likely to experience higher offer 
price revision during the roadshow. 
Finally, we expect the information revealed during the roadshow and the celebrity status of the 
firm’s insiders to have a positive influence on the IPO underpricing. Controlling for these two factors, we 
expect no significant differences in IPO underpricing between firms with and without individual 
blockholders, if the main reason for higher underpricing of firms with individual blockholders is the 
additional interest and hype from the potential IPO investors. Formally, our fourth and final hypothesis is 
as follows: 
H4: There will be no significant differences in IPO underpricing between firms with and without 
individual blockholders, after controlling for the information revealed during the roadshow and 
the celebrity status of the firm’s insiders; this effect should be more pronounced for firms with 
VCs as the largest corporate blockholder 
4. Data and sample selection 
4.1. Sample selection 
We obtained a list of all common equity US IPOs issued between 2005 and 2018 from 
SDC/Platinum New Issue database, eliminating financials (SIC between 6000 and 6999), unit offerings, 
and foreign firms. This left us with a sample of 1,122 firms. Then, based on the information contained in 
the prospectus, we eliminated offering of non-common equity (mostly LLC units), unit offerings 
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(consisting of common shares and warrants), equity carve-outs, foreign firms (misclassified by the SDC), 
offering of companies that had undergone leveraged buyouts and bankruptcy in the past, seasoned equity 
offerings, rights and best efforts offerings, as well as those trading on OTC and those going public using 
the open-IPO method. We also eliminated firms which are not included in the CRSP and COMPUSTAT 
databases. This leave us with a sample of 985 firms. Panel A of Table 1 includes the detailed information 
of the screening process while Panel B shows the sample distribution by year. 
The closing price on the first day of trading is obtained from CRSP. Original high and low filing 
price, total assets, founding year as well as the ownership stakes of all blockholders are obtained from 
prospectus in EDGAR. We rank the underwriter reputation following the method described in Loughran 
and Ritter (2004). 
Table 2 reports full sample summary statistics for the variables used in this paper. During our 
sample period, IPO underpricing was, on average (median), 15.9% (8.5%). The final offer price, on 
average, was 4.3% lower than the middle of the initial filing range.  
We define a blockholder as an entity controlling more than 5% of the voting rights in the firm. 
Individual blockholders are those that hold the shares directly or through a fully-controlled corporate 
entity. All other blockholders are classified as corporate blockholders. We further use information in the 
IPO prospectus to classify individual blockholders into three types: family, non-family insiders, and 
outsiders. An individual blockholder is classified as family if the individual (or her family) was involved 
in the founding of the firm.
5
 An individual blockholder is classified as a non-family insider (outsider) if 
he or she is (is not) involved in the management of the firm and is not a member of the founding family. 
Corporate blockholders are classified into two types – venture capitalists (VC) and non-venture capitalists 
(non-VC). VCs are corporate blockholder listed in the Pratt’s guide to private equity and venture capital 
sources. All other corporate blockholders are classified as non-venture capitalists. 
 
                                                          
5
 We treat multiple family members as a group and therefore add their ownership stakes. 
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4.2. Ownership structure of US IPOs 
We describe the ownerships structure along the two dimensions – the presence and identity of 
blockholders. In Table 3 we have classified our sample based on the identity of the largest blockholders -- 
individual and corporate. Individual blockholders appear in 51.9% of firms going public. Families 
represent 61.5% of the largest individual blockholder, with non-family insiders and outsiders representing 
21.1% and 17.4%, respectively. Families also control a higher percentage of voting rights, as compared to 
the other two types of individual blockholders – 23.1% as compared to 17.5 and 17.7%. There is also a 
significant variation in the ownership stakes of the largest individual blockholders depending on the 
presence, if any, of the corporate blockholders. Ownership stakes of the largest individual blockholders 
are the highest in firms with no corporate blockholders, followed by those with non-venture capitalists as 
the largest corporate blockholder. The largest individual blockholders, on average, hold the lowest 
ownership stakes in firms with venture capitalists as the largest corporate blockholder.  
Corporate blockholders are present in 90.3% of firms. Almost two-thirds (64.6%) of the largest 
corporate blockholders are venture capitalists, who, on average, control 23.8% of IPO firm’s voting rights. 
Non-venture capitalists as the largest corporate blockholders hold slightly higher ownership stakes – 
27.8%, on average. The difference in the ownership stakes between VC and non-VC corporate 
blockholders is driven mainly by significantly higher holdings of non-VC blockholders in firms without 
individual blockholders (36% versus 24.5%). Firms with corporate blockholders are less likely to have 
individual blockholders – about 55% (47%) of VC-backed (non-VC-backed) firms have no individual 
blockholders. Firms with non-VC as the largest corporate blockholder have a slightly higher prevalence 
of families and non-family insiders as the largest individual blockholders. 
 
5. Empirical tests and results 
5.1. Univariate tests regarding the IPO underpricing 
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To examine the influence of the ownership structure on the IPO underpricing, we split the sample 
into twelve categories as discussed above. The results are reported in Table 4. The first row of Table 4 
reports IPO underpricing for subsamples based on the corporate blockholder presence, if any, irrespective 
of the presence of individual blockholders. While the firms with VCs as the largest corporate blockholder 
had a somewhat higher underpricing (both in terms of the mean and median), the differences with firms 
without corporate blockholders were not statistically significant.
6
  
The first column of Table 4 reports IPO underpricing for subsamples based on the individual 
blockholder presence, if any, irrespective of the presence of corporate blockholders. We find that firms 
with individual blockholders had a significantly higher underpricing that did those without individual 
blockholders. These differences were most pronounced and most significant (at the 1% level) for family 
and outsider firms with mean (median) differences of 7% (9.5%) and 7.9% (8%), respectively. 
Non-family insider firms also had higher IPO underpricing than did their counterparts without individual 
blockholders, but only the median difference of 7% was statistically significant.  
We then examine IPO underpricing for various subsamples based on the presence, if any, of the 
individual and corporate blockholders. We find that differences in IPO underpricing between firms with 
and without individual blockholders documented above are driven by venture-backed-firms. For these 
firms, the differences between family (outsider) firms and their counterparts without individual 
blockholders are 10.4% (14%). The median differences are 14.7% and 12.5%, respectively. All of these 
are statistically significant at the 1% level. Venture-backed non-family insider firms also had higher IPO 
underpricing than did their counterparts without individual blockholders with the mean difference of 5.9% 
(significant at the 10% level) and the median difference of 12.7% (significant at the 1% level).  
Finally, we find that family firms with venture capitalists as the largest corporate blockholder had 
by 9.2% (12.8%) higher IPO underpricing than did family firms without corporate blockholders. The 
difference is statistically significant at the 5% level for the mean and 1% for the median. We also find that 
                                                          
6
 In unreported results, we find that the mean (median) difference in IPO underpricing between venture-backed and 
non-venture-backed firms was marginally significant (insignificant) at the 10% level. 
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non-VC-backed non-family insider firms had significantly lower underpricing than did non-family firms 
without corporate blockholders. This result, however, should be taken with a grain of salt, given the small 
number of non-family insider firms without corporate blockholders.  
 Overall, our results suggest that firms with individual blockholders are more underpriced than 
those without individual blockholders. At this point, however, we are not able to distinguish between the 
two competing reasons – higher level of asymmetric information about such firms or higher celebrity 
status and attention from IPO investors. To distinguish between them, we now examine the univariate 
differences in the offer price revision during the roadshow. 
 
5.2. Univariate tests regarding the offer price revision 
To examine the influence of the ownership structure on the offer price revision, we again split the 
sample into twelve categories discussed above. The results are reported in Table 5. We find that corporate 
blockholder backed firms without individual blockholders experienced the most significant negative offer 
price adjustment between the middle of the initial filing range and the final offer price. Non-VC backed 
non-family insider firms also experienced a significant downward revision in the offer price as did family 
firms with no corporate blockholders (the results for this sub-sample, however, are less significant). In 
contrast, family VC-backed firms have the only positive (median) offer price revision, albeit marginally 
so, with the corresponding values for the VC-backed non-family insider and outsider firms being zero. 
Overall, this leads to statistically significant differences in the offer price revisions between VC-backed 
firms with no individual blockholders and those with either type of the individual blockholder.  
Overall our results suggest that (relatively speaking) VC-backed firms with individual 
blockholders had a more positive reception during the roadshow than did their counterparts without the 
individual blockholders. This difference in the market feedback between the two types of firms is likely to 
have led to a decreased (an increased) demand from the retail investors for the VC-backed firms without 
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5.3. IPO underpricing and the presence of blockholders 
We now examine the relationship between IPO underpricing and the presence of individual 
blockholders in firms with different corporate blockholders, if any. We do so by estimating the following 
regression equation: 
 




Controls𝑘𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  
(1) 
The dependent variable is defined as the percentage change between the final offer price and the 
closing price on the first day of trading. All control variables are as defined in Appendix A. The results, 
reported in Table 6, indicate that there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between IPO 
underpricing and individual blockholder presence in VC-backed firms (see column 2). The effect is most 
pronounced for firms in which the largest individual blockholder is an outsider followed by those with the 
family as the largest individual blockholder. The presence of these types of individual blockholders 
increase IPO underpricing by 13% and 7.9%, respectively, relative to the VC-backed firms with no 
individual blockholders. For firms with a non-VC as the largest corporate blockholder as well as those 
without any corporate blockholder, we fail to find any significant influence of individual blockholders’ 
presence on IPO underpricing (relative to the firms with no individual blockholders).
8
 
                                                          
7
 Our findings suggest that underwriters consistently overestimate the initial filing range for firms without 
individual blockholders. We conjecture that this may be due to the potential litigation risk. In particular, an upward 
offer price revision may expose the entities involved (firm, its insiders, underwriters, and pre-IPO corporate 
investors, if any) to a potential litigation if such a revision is seen as taking advantage of the market overvaluation. It 
may be, therefore, more prudent for the underwriters and insiders to overestimate the initial filing range and then 
adjust the final offer price downward (as opposed to underestimating / correctly estimating the initial filing range 
and then adjusting the final offer price upward). 
8
 The significant coefficient estimate for non-family insider firms with no corporate blockholders is, as alluded to 
earlier, likely due to the rather small size of that subsample. 
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We now examine the influence of the corporate blockholder presence on IPO underpricing in 
firms with the four types of individual blockholders – none, family, non-family, and outsiders.  
The results are reported in Table 7. We find that none of the coefficient estimates for VC and 
non-VC dummies are significant with the exception of the non-VC dummy in non-family firms (column 
3). The magnitude and the significance of the coefficient estimate, however, should be taken with a grain 
of salt due to the small sample size of the comparison group.  
 Overall, our results confirm Hypothesis 1 that firms with individual blockholder are associated 
with higher IPO underpricing than are firms without any individual blockholders, with the influence being 
most pronounced for venture-backed firms. Why would individual blockholders and venture capitalists 
consistently leave money on the table? VCs are repeat players in the IPO market. Their reputation is of 
crucial importance in successfully assisting the portfolio companies in going public. Because of this, 
venture capitalists have little incentive to go for the highest possible offer price if it means taking full 
advantage of the (hyped-up) celebrity status of individual blockholders. Further, VCs seldom sell their 
shares in the IPO, and therefore do not directly benefit from a higher offer price. A higher offer price, 
however, would potentially expose the firm going public to a shareholder litigation should the hype about 
the firm turn out to be short-lived (see Walker, Turtle, Pukthuanthong and Thiengtham, 2015). Such a 
litigation would certainly have negative influence on the VC reputation (see, Liu, Paeglis, and Walker, 
2006).  
Individual blockholders are also subject to the same litigation risk considerations and therefore 
have lower incentives to increase the offer price to reflect the potentially hyped up valuation. Further, IPO 
offer price is an implied benchmark for the performance of a newly public firm for a considerable time 
after the IPO.
9
 Thus, there could be a negative press effect from being below the offer price for extended 
periods of time, implying the company is a bad investment. To summarize, it is likely that the benefits 
                                                          
9
 Perhaps the best example of this Facebook, Inc. The final offer price on May 12, 2012 was set at $38. The closing 
price on the first day of trading was $38.27. After that the stock price dropped below the offer price and stayed there 
until August 2013. When the stock price finally exceeded the IPO offer price, the media noted that “a full year later, 
the social network seemed to still be having a hard time shaking off the bad rap” (Van Grove, 2013). 
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from a higher offer price may be far lower than the associated costs in terms of loss of reputation (for both 
the individual blockholders and venture capitalists) and potential litigation costs.  
 
5.4. Offer price revision and the presence of blockholders 
 We now examine the relationship between the offer price revision and the presence of individual 
blockholders for firms with different corporate blockholders to gain additional insights into the causes of 
higher underpricing of firms with individual blockholders documented above. We do so by estimating the 
following regression equation: 
 




Controls𝑘𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  
(2) 
The dependent variable is defined as the percentage change from the middle of the initial filing 
range to the final offer price. The results are reported in Table 8. In firms with a VC as the largest 
corporate blockholder, all three types of the largest individual blockholders are positively and statistically 
significantly related to the offer price revision during the roadshow. The effect is the most pronounced in 
firms with non-family insiders as the largest individual blockholders (7.9% increase relative to the firms 
with no individual blockholders), followed by the firms in which the family is the largest individual 
blockholder (6.7% increase).  
In firms with a non-VC largest corporate blockholder, only those with family or an outsider as the 
largest individual blockholder are associated with a higher offer price revision. Both of these types of 
firms have by 4.9% higher offer price revisions, as compared to the firms with a non-VC as the largest 
corporate blockholder and no individual blockholders. Finally, in firms without a corporate blockholder, 
we do not find any significant differences in the offer price revision between firms without individual 
blockholders and those with either of the three types of individual blockholders.  
20 
 
Overall, we find that in firms with corporate blockholders (of either type), the presence of individual 
blockholders are likely to attract interest from the potential IPO investors and therefore lead to an upward 
adjustment to the offer price during the roadshow. 
We then examine the influence of the corporate blockholder presence on the offer price revision in 
firms with different kinds of largest individual blockholder. The results are reported in Table 9. The 
coefficient estimates of VC and Non-VC dummies are not significant in any of the columns. This implies 
that the presence of corporate blockholders doesn’t affect the offer price revisions for firms with either 
type of the largest individual blockholder. 
 
5.5. Dollar wealth of the largest individual blockholder, offer price revision, and IPO underpricing 
We use the dollar wealth of the largest individual blockholder as a proxy for the extent of the 
celebrity status of the firm’s largest individual blochkholder. We argue that the higher the dollar wealth of 
the largest individual blockholder, the higher the likelihood that such a blockholder will be a celebrity 
entrepreneur, attracting attention of media and potential IPO investors (especially the retail ones).
10
 
We now examine the influence of the dollar value of the largest individual blockholder’s wealth on 
the offer price revision. We do so by estimating the following regression equation 
 Offer price revisioni = 𝛷o + 𝛷1Familyi + 𝛷2Non − Familyi + 𝛷3Outsideri + 




Controlski + εi 
 
(3) 
To allow for the dollar wealth of the largest individual blockholder to have a different influence on the 
offer price revision for various types of the individual blockholders, we introduce the two interactive 
dummy variables – dollar wealth * non-family and dollar wealth * outsider.  
In Table 10 we report the results for the subsamples based on the presence, if any, of the 
corporate blockholders. We find that the dollar wealth of the largest individual blockholder has a positive 
                                                          
10
 See Stupples and Pendleton (2020) for a recent example. 
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influence on the offer price revision, but only for venture-backed firms. The coefficient estimate in 
column 2 is positive and statistically significant at the 10% level. We also find that the influence of the 
dollar wealth on the offer price revision for outsider firms is significantly lower than that in the case of 
family firms. More importantly, family and non-family dummy variables are no longer significant. This 
indicates that, after controlling for the dollar wealth of the largest individual blockholder, the differences 
in the offer price revisions between firms with no individual blockholders and those with family or 
non-family insiders as the largest individual blockholders are no longer significant. This suggests that the 
significant differences reported in Table 8 were mostly driven by firms with large dollar wealth of the 
largest individual blockholder, which are most likely to attract the attention of financial press and IPO 
investors. The results for firms with no corporate blockholders or those with a non-VC as the largest 
corporate blockholder remain insignificant, indicating that the positive effect of higher dollar wealth of 
the largest individual blockholder is mostly pronounced in venture-backed firms.  
 In Table 11 we repeat the above analysis for the subsamples of firms by the type of the largest 
individual blockholder. We find that the dollar wealth of the largest individual blockholder does not have 
a significant influence on the offer price revision for either of the four subsamples. Also, the coefficient 
estimates on VC and non-VC dummy variables remain insignificant. Overall, our results suggest that the 
media attention and celebrity status of the largest individual blockholder (as proxied by her dollar wealth), 
explain the differences in the offer price revisions documented above. 
We now examine the influence of the presence of individual blockholders on IPO underpricing, 
controlling for both the offer price revision as well as for the dollar wealth of the largest individual 
blockholder. The results are reported in Table 12. We find that the dollar wealth of the largest individual 
blockholder had a positive and statistically significant influence on the IPO underpricing of firms with a 
VC as the largest corporate blockholder. The magnitude of the impact was also economically significant – 
a one standard deviation increase in the dollar wealth of the largest individual blockholder (as reported in 
Table 2) increased the IPO underpricing by 19.75%. Further, we find that the coefficient estimates on the 
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individual blockholder dummies are now negative and statistically significant. This implies that, after 
controlling for the partial adjustment and the dollar wealth of the largest individual blockholder, the 
underpricing of the firms with a VC as the largest blockholder and with an individual blockholder 
(irrespective of the type) was lower than that of their counterparts without individual blockholders.  
 For the firms with a non-VC as the largest corporate blockholder, we find that the dollar wealth 
had a negative and marginally significant influence on the IPO underpricing. At the same time, the 
coefficient estimate on family remained positive and statistically significant, suggesting that the attention 
attracted by such firms does not explain the higher underpricing experienced by them. Finally, for firms 
with no corporate blockholders we do not find any significant differences between various types of 
individual blockholders. The coefficient estimate on the dollar wealth is insignificant as well. Overall, our 
findings are consistent with the conjecture that the celebrity status is most likely attributed to the 
individual blockholders in venture-backed firms. 
 In Table 13, we examine the influence of the presence of corporate blockholders on IPO 
underpricing, controlling for both the offer price revision as well as for the dollar wealth of the largest 
individual blockholder. We find that the dollar wealth of the largest individual blockholder had a positive 
and significant influence on the IPO underpricing only for the firms with family as the largest individual 
blockholder. For the other three subsamples the influence was not statistically significant. We also find 
that the coefficient estimate on non-VC in column 3 was negative and statistically significant. This 
indicates that, even after controlling for the offer price revision and the dollar wealth of the largest 
individual blockholder, among firms with non-family insiders as the largest individual blockholder those 
with a non-VC as the largest corporate blockholder had lower IPO underpricing than did firms without 
any corporate blockholder.  
 
6. Conclusions 
We examine the influence of ownership structure on the underpricing of initial public offerings 
(IPOs) in the US. While the existing literature has largely focused either on founders or venture capitalists, 
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we show that the ownership structure of US IPOs is more complex and cannot be adequately 
characterized by these two types of blockholders. We find that the influence of blockholders on 
underpricing is not unidimensional – the positive influence of individual blockholders (venture capital 
backing) on underpricing is present only in the venture-backed firms (those with individual blockholders). 
We also find that such firms experience insignificant offer price revision, suggesting that their higher 
underpricing is not driven by negative information revealed during the roadshow. Further, we find that 
our measure of the largest individual blockholder’s celebrity status (his or her dollar wealth) is positively 
related to both the offer price revision and the IPO underpricing for venture-backed firms with individual 
blockholders. More importantly, the difference in underpricing between VC-backed firms with individual 
blockholders and those without is no longer significant once we control for the celebrity status of 
individual blockholders. 
Our paper has implication for the broader IPO literature. Consider the literature on the influence 
of VCs on underpricing, which has reported conflicting results – the early studies showed that 
venture-backed IPOs are less underpriced, while the more recent ones have found the opposite result. Our 
findings suggest that the higher underpricing of VC-backed firms may not be driven by the venture 
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Underpricing The percentage change from the offer price to the market price at the end of the 
stock’s first trading day 
Offer price revision The percentage change in the final offer price from the middle of the initial filing 
range 
Dollar wealth The natural logarithm of one plus the dollar value of the ownership stake of the 
largest individual blockholder (at the final offer price) 
Family A dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the largest individual blockholder 
is the founding family, and zero otherwise 
Non-family insider A dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the largest individual blockholder 
is a non-family insider, and zero otherwise; an insider is defined as any individual 
(or a family member thereof) who is involved in the management of the firm 
Outsider A dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the largest individual blockholder 
is outsider, and zero otherwise; an outsider is defined as any individual (or a family 
member thereof) who is not involved in the management of the firm 
VC A dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the largest corporate blockholder 
is a venture capitalist, and zero otherwise 
Non-VC A dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the largest corporate blockholder 
is a non-venture capitalist, and zero otherwise 
Firm size The natural logarithm of the book value of total assets, as reported in the prospectus 
Firm age The number of years between the year of incorporation or start of the operations 
(whichever comes earlier) and the time of IPO 
Tech dummy A dummy variable that takes on the value of one if the firm belongs to a technology 
industry as defined by Loughran and Ritter (2004), and zero otherwise 







Table 1 Sample screening and the number of IPOs by year 
Panel A: Sample screening of US IPOs issued between 2005 and 2018 from SDC/Platinum New Issue database  
 
Initial sample 1122 
less 
 Former LBOs and bankruptcy 36 
SEOs 12 
LLC units 7 
Best efforts 15 
Carve-outs 3 
Foreign firms 24 
Rights offering 1 
Unit offerings 34 
Firms not in Compustat/CRSP 2 
OTC trading 2 
Open-IPO 1 
 




Panel B: Number of IPOs by year  
 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 




Table 2 Summary statistics 
The sample consists of 985 initial public offerings between 2005 and 2018. All variables are as described in the 







Mean Median St dev 
    Underpricing 0.159 0.085 0.247 
Offer price revision -0.043 0.000 0.173 
Dollar wealth 9.330 15.667 8.978 
Family 0.319 0.000 0.466 
Non-family insider 0.110 0.000 0.313 
Outsider 0.090 0.000 0.287 
VC 0.583 1.000 0.493 
Non-VC 0.320 0.000 0.467 
Firm size 5.116 4.933 1.268 
Firm age 2.293 2.197 0.797 
Tech dummy 0.359 0.000 0.480 
Underwriter reputation 8.014 9.001 1.625 






Table 3 Ownership structure of US initial public offerings 
Numbers are ownership of the largest individual blockholder; numbers in parentheses are the ownership of the 
largest corporate blockholder; numbers in [] are the number of observations. The sample consists of 985 initial 
public offerings between 2005 and 2018. All variables are as described in the Appendix.  
 
Largest block 
Full No corporate VC Non-VC 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
         
Full   0.398 0.352 0.068 0 0.096 0.054 
   (0) (0) (0.238) (0.196) (0.278) (0.210) 
   [96] [574] [315] 




0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(0.277) (0.209) (0) (0) (0.245) (0.191) (0.360) (0.313) 
[474] [9] [316] [149] 




0.231 0.147 0.447 0.415 0.164 0.115 0.199 0.137 
(0.170) (0.160) (0) (0) (0.223) (0.201) (0.194) (0.148) 
[314] [62] [155] [97] 




0.175 0.100 0.566 0.488 0.133 0.084 0.169 0.115 
(0.231) (0.190) (0) (0) (0.264) (0.212) (0.225) (0.174) 
[108] [7] [57] [44] 




0.177 0.115 0.362 0.329 0.129 0.095 0.132 0.109 
(0.164) (0.140) (0) (0) (0.208) (0.175) (0.202) (0.184) 
[89] [18] [46] [25] 





Table 4 Univariate tests of IPO underpricing by the type of blockholders 
The mean (median) of IPO underpricing, defined as the percentage change from the offer price to the market price at 
the end of the stock’s first trading day, and [number of observations] for the sample and each subsample are 




 percentiles. The sample consists of 985 initial public 
offerings between 2005 and 2018. The results of t-tests of differences in means and nonparametric Wilcoxon signed 





corporate VC Non-VC 




       Full 0.159 0.150 0.171 0.138 0.021 -0.011 
 
(0.085) (0.082) (0.102) (0.068) (0.020) (-0.014) 
 [985] [96] [574] [315]   
       No individual 0.126 0.137 0.126 0.125 -0.011 -0.012 
 
(0.055) (0.107) (0.046) (0.061) (-0.061) (-0.046) 
 
[474] [9] [316] [149] 
  
       Family 0.196 0.138 0.230 0.179 0.092** 0.041 
 
(0.150) (0.065) (0.193) (0.079) (0.128)*** (0.014) 
 
[314] [62] [155] [97] 
  
       Non-family insider 0.154 0.283 0.185 0.095 -0.098 -0.188** 
 
(0.126) (0.408) (0.172) (0.050) (-0.235) (-0.358)* 
 
[108] [7] [57] [44] 
  
       Outsider 0.205 0.144 0.266 0.137 0.122 -0.007 
 
(0.135) (0.069) (0.171) (0.125) (0.102)* (0.056) 
 
[89] [18] [46] [25] 
  
       Family less No individual 0.070*** 0.001 0.104*** 0.054* 
  
 
(0.095)*** (-0.041) (0.147)*** (0.018) 
  
       Non-family less No individual 0.029 0.146 0.059* -0.030 
  
 
(0.070)** (0.301) (0.127)*** (-0.011) 
  
       Outsider less No individual 0.079*** 0.007 0.140*** 0.012 
  
 
(0.080)*** (-0.037) (0.125)*** (0.064) 










Table 5 Univariate tests of the offer price revision during the roadshow by the types of blockholders 
The mean (median) of offer price revision, defined as the percentage change in the final offer price from the middle 
of the initial filing range, and [number of observations] for the sample and each subsample are presented below. 




 percentiles. The sample consists of 985 initial public offerings 
between 2005 and 2018. The results of t-tests of differences in means and nonparametric Wilcoxon signed rank tests 










       Full -0.043*** -0.037** -0.043*** -0.044*** -0.006 -0.007 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000) (0.000) 
 [985] [96] [574] [315]   
       No individual -0.072*** -0.005 -0.082*** -0.055*** -0.076 -0.049 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000) (-0.025)*** (0.000)*** (-0.025) (0.000) 
 
[474] [9] [316] [149] 
  
       Family -0.013 -0.052** 0.010 -0.024* 0.062** 0.027 
 
(0.000) (-0.057)* (0.056)* (0.000) (0.113)** (0.057) 
 
[314] [62] [155] [97] 
  
       Non-family insider -0.025* -0.018 0.003 -0.063*** 0.021 -0.044 
 
(0.000) (0.067) (0.000) (-0.065)*** (-0.067) (-0.131) 
 
[108] [7] [57] [44] 
  
       Outsider -0.019 -0.010 -0.018 -0.027 -0.008 -0.017 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
[89] [18] [46] [25] 
  
       Family less No individual 0.059*** -0.046 0.092*** 0.030 
  
 
(0.000)*** (-0.057) (0.080)*** (0.000) 
  
       Non-family less No individual 0.047** -0.013 0.085*** -0.008 
  
 
(0.000)* (0.067) (0.025)*** (-0.065) 
  
       Outsider less No individual 0.053** -0.005 0.064** 0.027 
  
 
(0.000)** (0.000) (0.025)** (0.000) 











Table 6 IPO underpricing by the type of corporate blockholder 
The dependent variable is IPO underpricing, defined as the percentage change from the offer price to the market 
price at the end of the stock’s first trading day. Column 1, 2, and 3 present the results for the subsample with no 
corporate blockholder, VC is the largest corporate blockholder, and the largest corporate blockholder is a non-VC, 
respectively. Family is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the largest individual blockholder is the 
founding family, and zero otherwise. Non-family insider (outsider) is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one 
if the largest individual blockholder is (outsider) a non-family insider, and zero otherwise. Underpricing is 




 percentiles. The sample consists of 985 initial public offerings between 2005 and 2018. 
All variables are as described in the Appendix. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted (White) standard errors are used in 
calculation of t-statistics that are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 No corporate VC Non-VC 
    
Family 0.099 0.079 0.053 
 (1.38) (3.07)*** (1.56) 
Non-family insider 0.227 0.064 -0.025 
 (2.25)** (1.92)* (0.66) 
Outsider 0.061 0.130 0.027 
 (0.67) (3.09)*** (0.64) 
Firm size -0.041 0.014 -0.022 
 (1.63) (1.54) (2.23)** 
Firm age 0.037 -0.022 0.022 
 (1.48) (1.56) (1.79)* 
Tech dummy 0.103 0.084 0.020 
 (1.60) (3.81)*** (0.62) 
Underwriter reputation 0.043 0.015 0.033 
 (2.35)** (1.40) (4.00)*** 
    
Constant -0.068 -0.151 -0.117 
 (0.66) (1.67)* (1.57) 
R
2
 0.30 0.14 0.16 
N 96 574 315 




Table 7 IPO underpricing by the type of individual blockholder 
The dependent variable is IPO underpricing, defined as the percentage change from the offer price to the market 
price at the end of the stock’s first trading day. Column 1, 2, 3, and 4 present the results for the subsample with no 
individual blockholder, family as the largest individual blockholder, non-family insider as the largest individual 
blockholder and outsider as the largest individual blockholder, respectively. VC is a dummy variable that takes on a 
value of one if the largest corporate blockholder is a venture capitalist, and zero otherwise. Non-VC is a dummy 
variable that takes on a value of one if the largest corporate blockholder is a non-venture capitalist, and zero 




 percentiles. The sample consists of 985 initial public 
offerings between 2005 and 2018. All variables are as described in the Appendix. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted 
(White) standard errors are used in calculation of t-statistics that are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 No individual Family Non-family Outsider 
     
VC -0.035 -0.013 -0.108 0.011 
 (0.56) (0.31) (1.23) (0.12) 
Non-VC -0.022 0.003 -0.205 -0.034 
 (0.33) (0.08) (2.67)*** (0.38) 
Firm size -0.003 -0.009 0.017 -0.008 
 (0.33) (0.66) (0.58) (0.36) 
Firm age 0.010 0.009 0.030 0.015 
 (0.94) (0.49) (1.17) (0.33) 
Tech dummy 0.052 0.092 0.051 0.040 
 (2.18)** (2.70)*** (1.11) (0.68) 
Underwriter reputation 0.017 0.035 0.004 0.039 
 (1.94)* (3.36)*** (0.20) (2.44)** 
     
Constant -0.075 -0.103 0.048 -0.111 
 (0.84) (1.17) (0.35) (0.78) 
R
2
 0.09 0.17 0.27 0.21 
N 474 314 108 89 






Table 8 Offer price revision by the type of corporate blockholder 
The dependent variable is offer price revision, defined as the percentage change in the final offer price from the 
initial filing range. Column 1, 2, and 3 present the results for the subsample with no corporate blockholder, VC is 
the largest corporate blockholder, and the largest corporate blockholder is a non-VC, respectively. Family is a 
dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the largest individual blockholder is the founding family, and zero 
otherwise. Non-family insider (outsider) is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the largest individual 
blockholder is (outsider) a non-family insider, and zero otherwise. The sample consists of 985 initial public 
offerings between 2005 and 2018. All variables are as described in the Appendix. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted 
(White) standard errors are used in calculation of t-statistics that are reported in parentheses. Offer price revision is 




 percentiles. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 No corporate VC Non-VC 
    
Family 0.031 0.067 0.049 
 (0.58) (4.13)*** (2.37)** 
Non-family insider 0.081 0.079 0.026 
 (0.96) (3.75)*** (1.00) 
Outsider 0.082 0.050 0.049 
 (1.29) (1.92)* (1.89)* 
Firm size 0.014 0.035 0.017 
 (0.80) (4.91)*** (2.19)** 
Firm age 0.009 -0.024 -0.012 
 (0.48) (2.26)** (1.39) 
Tech dummy 0.054 0.075 0.026 
 (1.31) (5.04)*** (1.33) 
Underwriter reputation 0.018 0.017 0.010 
 (1.65) (2.16)** (1.87)* 
    
Constant -0.206 -0.413 -0.192 
 (1.97)* (5.59)*** (3.96)*** 
R
2
 0.30 0.21 0.14 
N 96 574 315 




Table 9 Offer price revision by the type of individual blockholder 
The dependent variable is offer price revision, defined as the percentage change in the final offer price from the 
initial filing range. Column 1, 2, 3, and 4 present the results for the subsample with no individual blockholder, 
family as the largest individual blockholder, non-family insider as the largest individual blockholder and outsider as 
the largest individual blockholder, respectively. VC is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the largest 
corporate blockholder is a venture capitalist, and zero otherwise. Non-VC is a dummy variable that takes on a value 
of one if the largest corporate blockholder is a non-venture capitalist, and zero otherwise. Offer price revision is 




 percentiles. The sample consists of 985 initial public offerings between 2005 and 2018. 
All variables are as described in the Appendix. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted (White) standard errors are used in 
calculation of t-statistics that are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 No individual Family Non-family Outsider 
     
VC -0.073 0.008 0.012 -0.081 
 (1.14) (0.31) (0.14) (1.38) 
Non-VC -0.054 0.007 -0.040 -0.050 
 (0.84) (0.26) (0.51) (0.89) 
Firm size 0.030 0.027 0.002 0.005 
 (3.80)*** (3.29)*** (0.11) (0.37) 
Firm age -0.011 -0.018 -0.003 -0.029 
 (1.21) (1.62) (0.16) (1.49) 
Tech dummy 0.072 0.060 0.023 0.031 
 (4.02)*** (3.22)*** (0.80) (0.93) 
Underwriter reputation 0.011 0.009 0.030 0.020 
 (1.41) (1.54) (2.28)** (1.54) 
     
Constant -0.255 -0.159 -0.232 -0.103 
 (2.83)*** (2.90)*** (1.67)* (1.25) 
R
2
 0.16 0.18 0.27 0.25 
N 474 314 108 89 




Table 10 Offer price revision by the type of corporate blockholder, controlling for the dollar wealth of the 
largest individual blockholder 
The dependent variable is offer price revision, defined as the percentage change in the final offer price from the 
initial filing range. Column 1, 2, and 3 present the results for the subsample with no corporate blockholder, VC as 
the largest corporate blockholder, and the largest corporate blockholder is a non-VC, respectively. Family is a 
dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the largest individual blockholder is the founding family, and zero 
otherwise. Non-family insider (outsider) is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the largest individual 





 percentiles. The sample consists of 985 initial public offerings between 2005 and 2018. All variables are as 
described in the Appendix. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted (White) standard errors are used in calculation of t-statistics 
that are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 No corporate VC Non-VC 
    
Family -0.267 -0.120 0.041 
 (0.64) (1.15) (0.83) 
Non-family insider -0.959 -0.102 -0.100 
 (0.89) (0.52) (0.40) 
Outsider -0.157 0.130 -0.101 
 (0.27) (1.89)* (0.56) 
Firm size 0.004 0.032 0.016 
 (0.18) (4.41)*** (2.04)** 
Firm age 0.009 -0.022 -0.011 
 (0.44) (2.06)** (1.32) 
Tech dummy 0.056 0.074 0.026 
 (1.30) (4.96)*** (1.32) 
Underwriter reputation 0.014 0.017 0.009 
 (1.13) (2.12)** (1.69)* 
Dollar wealth 0.015 0.010 0.000 
 (0.71) (1.87)* (0.15) 
Dollar wealth*non-family 0.040 -0.000 0.007 
 (0.72) (0.01) (0.47) 
Dollar wealth*outsider -0.003 -0.015 0.008 
 (0.11) (2.19)** (0.82) 
    
Constant -0.109 -0.400 -0.183 
 (0.70) (5.32)*** (3.50)*** 
R
2
 0.31 0.21 0.14 













Table 11 Offer price revision by the type of individual blockholder, controlling for the dollar wealth of the 
largest individual blockholder 
The dependent variable is offer price revision, defined as the percentage change in the final offer price from the 
initial filing range. Column 1, 2, 3, and 4 present the results for the subsample with no individual blockholder, 
family as the largest individual blockholder, non-family insider as the largest individual blockholder and outsider as 
the largest individual blockholder, respectively. VC is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the largest 
corporate blockholder is a venture capitalist, and zero otherwise. Non-VC is a dummy variable that takes on a value 
of one if the largest corporate blockholder is a non-venture capitalist, and zero otherwise. Offer price revision is 




 percentiles. The sample consists of 985 initial public offerings between 2005 and 2018. 
All variables are as described in the Appendix. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted (White) standard errors are used in 
calculation of t-statistics that are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 No individual Family Non-family Outsider 
     
VC -0.073 -0.210 -0.861 -0.117 
 (1.14) (0.72) (0.77) (0.20) 
Non-VC -0.054 0.160 -0.709 -0.074 
 (0.84) (0.55) (0.61) (0.18) 
Firm size 0.030 0.009 -0.010 0.003 
 (3.80)*** (0.72) (0.53) (0.18) 
Firm age -0.011 -0.016 0.003 -0.029 
 (1.21) (1.44) (0.17) (1.26) 
Tech dummy 0.072 0.057 0.012 0.028 
 (4.02)*** (3.02)*** (0.41) (0.80) 
Underwriter reputation 0.011 0.009 0.033 0.019 
 (1.41) (1.66)* (2.44)** (1.20) 
Dollar wealth  0.019 -0.023 0.002 
  (1.21) (0.41) (0.05) 
Dollar wealth*VC  0.013 0.050 0.002 
  (0.81) (0.85) (0.07) 
Dollar wealth*non-VC  -0.008 0.038 0.002 
  (0.50) (0.61) (0.07) 
     
Constant -0.255 -0.437 0.226 -0.118 
 (2.83)*** (1.60) (0.21) (0.25) 
R
2
 0.16 0.20 0.29 0.25 



















Table 12 IPO underpricing by the type of corporate blockholder, controlling for the dollar wealth of the 
largest individual blockholder 
The dependent variable is IPO underpricing, defined as the percentage change from the offer price to the market 
price at the end of the stock’s first trading day. Column 1, 2, and 3 present the results for the subsample with no 
corporate blockholder, VC is the largest corporate blockholder, and the largest corporate blockholder is a non-VC, 
respectively. Family is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the largest individual blockholder is the 
founding family, and zero otherwise. Non-family insider (outsider) is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one 
if the largest individual blockholder is (outsider) a non-family insider, and zero otherwise. Underpricing and offer 




 percentiles. The sample consists of 985 initial public offerings 
between 2005 and 2018. All variables are as described in the Appendix. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted (White) 
standard errors are used in calculation of t-statistics that are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 No corporate VC Non-VC 
    
Family 0.291 -0.360 0.153 
 (0.60) (2.14)** (1.91)* 
Non-family insider 0.401 -0.375 0.089 
 (0.81) (2.26)** (1.09) 
Outsider 0.231 -0.285 0.122 
 (0.48) (1.76)* (1.49) 
Firm size -0.041 -0.014 -0.033 
 (1.38) (1.48) (3.56)*** 
Firm age 0.033 -0.006 0.031 
 (1.37) (0.44) (2.84)*** 
Tech dummy 0.078 0.036 -0.000 
 (1.31) (1.76)* (0.01) 
Underwriter reputation 0.037 0.003 0.028 
 (2.11)** (0.35) (3.86)*** 
Offer price revision 0.434 0.592 0.737 
 (3.11)*** (10.54)*** (9.07)*** 
Dollar wealth -0.011 0.022 -0.008 
 (0.42) (2.38)** (1.73)* 
    
Constant -0.035 0.141 0.007 
 (0.20) (1.54) (0.10) 
R
2
 0.38 0.30 0.35 
N 96 574 315 


















Table 13 IPO underpricing by the type of corporate blockholder, controlling for the dollar wealth of the 
largest individual blockholder 
The dependent variable is IPO underpricing, defined as the percentage change from the offer price to the market 
price at the end of the stock’s first trading day. Column 1, 2, 3, and 4 present the results for the subsample with no 
individual blockholder, family as the largest individual blockholder, non-family insider as the largest individual 
blockholder and outsider as the largest individual blockholder, respectively. VC is a dummy variable that takes on a 
value of one if the largest corporate blockholder is a venture capitalist, and zero otherwise. Non-VC is a dummy 
variable that takes on a value of one if the largest corporate blockholder is a non-venture capitalist, and zero 




 percentiles. The sample consists of 
985 initial public offerings between 2005 and 2018. All variables are as described in the Appendix. 
Heteroskedasticity-adjusted (White) standard errors are used in calculation of t-statistics that are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 No individual Family Non-family Outsider 
     
VC 0.007 0.015 -0.115 0.092 
 (0.12) (0.36) (1.41) (0.95) 
Non-VC 0.014 0.023 -0.176 0.018 
 (0.24) (0.60) (2.40)** (0.21) 
Firm size -0.021 -0.062 0.016 -0.021 
 (2.88)*** (3.94)*** (0.54) (0.94) 
Firm age 0.016 0.023 0.032 0.036 
 (1.78)* (1.33) (1.57) (0.82) 
Tech dummy 0.009 0.048 0.035 0.009 
 (0.44) (1.54) (0.81) (0.16) 
Underwriter reputation 0.011 0.027 -0.017 0.022 
 (1.35) (2.80)*** (0.94) (1.39) 
Offer price revision 0.578 0.662 0.695 0.594 
 (10.20)*** (7.79)*** (5.44)*** (2.83)*** 
Dollar wealth -0.007 0.047 0.001 0.016 
 (1.36) (3.15)*** (0.03) (1.55) 
     
Constant 0.070 -0.676 0.201 -0.257 
 (0.84) (3.00)*** (0.66) (1.48) 
R
2
 0.28 0.34 0.44 0.33 
N 474 314 108 89 
     
 
